Talk like an expert : the construction of expertise in news comments concerning Climate Change by Coen, S et al.
Talk like  a n  exp e r t  : t h e  
cons t r u c tion  of exp e r ti s e  in n e w s  
co m m e n t s  conc e r nin g  Clim a t e  
Ch a n g e
Coe n,  S, M e r e di th,  JM, Woods,  R a n d  Fe r n a n d ez,  A
Tit l e Talk like  a n  exp e r t  : t h e  cons t r uc tion  of exp e r tis e  in n e w s  
co m m e n t s  conc e r nin g  Clim a t e  Ch a n g e
Aut h or s Coe n,  S, M e r e di t h,  JM, Woods,  R a n d  Fe r n a n d ez,  A
Typ e Article
U RL This  ve r sion  is available  a t :  
h t t p://usir.s alfor d. ac.uk/id/e p rin t/58 9 3 1/
P u bl i s h e d  D a t e 2 0 2 0
U SIR is a  digi t al collec tion  of t h e  r e s e a r c h  ou t p u t  of t h e  U nive r si ty of S alford.  
Whe r e  copyrigh t  p e r mi t s,  full t ex t  m a t e ri al  h eld  in t h e  r e posi to ry is m a d e  
fre ely availabl e  online  a n d  c a n  b e  r e a d ,  dow nloa d e d  a n d  copied  for  no n-
co m m e rcial p riva t e  s t u dy o r  r e s e a r c h  p u r pos e s .  Ple a s e  c h e ck  t h e  m a n u sc rip t  
for  a ny fu r t h e r  copyrig h t  r e s t ric tions.
For  m o r e  info r m a tion,  including  ou r  policy a n d  s u b mission  p roc e d u r e ,  ple a s e
con t ac t  t h e  Re posi to ry Tea m  a t :  u si r@s alford. ac.uk .
 1 
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This paper explores how readers of UK newspapers construct expertise around climate change (CC). 
It draws on 300 on-line readers’ comments on news items in The Guardian, Daily Mail and The 
Telegraph, concerning the release of the IPCC report calling for immediate action on CC. Comments 
were analysed using discursive psychology. We identified a series of discursive strategies that 
commenters adopted to present themselves as experts in their commentary. The (mostly indirect) 
use of category entitlements (implicitly claiming themselves as expert) and the presentation of one’s 
argument as factual (based on direct or indirect technical knowledge or common sense) emerged as 
common ways in which readers made claims to expertise, both among the supporters and among 
the sceptics of CC science. Our findings indicate that expertise is a fluid concept, constructed in 
diverse ways, with important implications for public engagement with CC science. 
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At a time that is often identified as the ‘post-truth’ era, it becomes important to understand how 
people represent reality, and their entitlement to claiming what is real, and what isn’t. When it 
comes to understanding and orienting our behaviour in a novel unknown area, we often rely on 
experts, that is, people with higher levels of knowledge, skill and experience in the subject (Hertzum, 
2014). The literature on expertise is vast, and a recent review demonstrates that expertise has been 
approached and defined in a variety of ways, depending on the particular area of research 
(Farrington-Darby and Wilson, 2006). Recently, however, traditional accounts of expertise – defined 
as the possession of specific abilities and knowledge which sets some people apart from others in 
specific areas – have been undermined by what appears to be acritical rejection of existing 
knowledge, leading to what Nichols (2017) calls the ‘death of expertise’. We therefore ask: how do 
people manage and claim expertise in a context in which expertise itself is under threat? This 
question becomes particularly important when talking about climate change (CC), a complex issue 
involving numerous scientific disciplines, including chemistry and physics (e.g. Seinfeld and Pandis, 
2016), meteorology (e.g. Westervelt et al., 2016), and biology and health sciences (e.g. Epstein, 
2001).  
 
Climate change and the politics of doubt 
The scientific community has been vocal in recent decades about the anthropogenic causes of, and 
substantial dangers posed by, CC and the urgent need for action (Union of Concerned Scientists, 
1997). Indeed, in a series of reports, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has repeatedly 
called for significant action aimed at reducing emissions and preparing for the impact of inevitable 
changes in global climate. However, scientists’ warnings have not been easily accepted by politicians 
or the public. In the past three decades, the political debate on whether and how governments 
should tackle CC has been the theatre of intense conflicts, resulting in the formation of two polarised 
camps, ‘sceptics’ and ‘pro-science’, usually aligned with right-wing and left-wing political ideologies, 
respectively (Bolsen and Shapiro, 2017; Brewer, 2012; Hornsey et al., 2016). This polarisation 
persists in some countries (such as the UK, USA, Australia and Norway), with substantial numbers of 
the public sceptical of the existence of CC and/or its anthropogenic origin (Santos and Feygina, 2017; 
Smith and Mayer, 2019).  
In the UK, while outright denial of the existence of CC is rare, only 36% of the population believe that 
CC is mainly or entirely due to human activity, and over half consider human and natural causes 
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equally responsible (Phillips et al., 2018). Thus, despite scientific consensus, some degree of 
scepticism regarding CC’s anthropogenic nature appears to be pervasive in the UK. One likely 
contributor to this scepticism is the way in which CC is represented in the media (Boykoff, 2007b). As 
with most political and social issues faced by modern countries, the media plays an important role in 
informing citizens about the current debates on sustainability and environment (Boykoff and 
Roberts, 2007). The mass media have proven to be very influential tools for raising public awareness 
of environmental issues (Schoenfeld et al., 1979; Slovic, 2000). However, they can also contribute to 
polarisation and resistance. For example, Boykoff (2007b) argues that the US media representation 
of CC fostered a move from (scientific) convergence to (political) contention.  
As the political debate intensified, and the coverage of the CC debate increased, communication and 
social researchers started questioning whether and how media (and news media in particular) were 
influencing the public’s understanding of this complex and multifaceted phenomenon. Attention has 
particularly been given to issues concerning the journalistic style in which mass media (and press in 
particular) covered the communication concerning the scientific debate on CC (e.g. Antilla, 2005; 
Carvalho, 2007; Grundman and Scott, 2014). Research has shown how British newspapers 
dramatised the issue of CC and challenged its scientific bases in various ways. First, tabloids, 
particularly the Daily Mail, have misrepresented scientific consensus on the anthropogenic causes of 
CC (Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008). Second, conservative newspapers, particularly The Times and The 
Telegraph, have framed CC in discourses that emphasise scientific uncertainty, given space to scep-
tics, privileged the perspective of industry, and/or downplayed the need for the UK to reduce GHG 
emissions (Carvalho, 2007; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Doulton and Brown, 2009; Painter and 
Gavin, 2016). Finally, metaphors derived from the religious domain have been deployed by part of 
the press to undermine the scientific basis of anthropogenic CC (Nerlich, 2010; Authors, 2012), thus 
leaving room for conspiracy-like interest-based arguments challenging CC science. Moreover, 
political voices (usually the main sources in the news, cf. Tiffen et al., 2014) are divided along 
ideological lines in their support of CC science (Brewer, 2012), thus allowing further opportunities to 
undermine it.  
While not all British newspaper articles challenge the scientific consensus (Boykoff 2007a), 
nevertheless, in various ways, and to various degrees, UK newspapers have employed a range of 
strategies to undermine climate scientists and their findings. These strategies may have contributed 
to the ongoing public scepticism of CC science evident in recent research (Phillips et al., 2018). The 
domain of CC, then, appears to suffer from the ‘death of expertise’ identified by Nichols (2017), in 
that traditionally valued scientific expertise (Livingstone and Lundt 1994) is widely contested.  
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If scientific credentials are no longer sufficient to confer expertise on CC, then what is? Critical to 
answering this question is Eriksson and Thornborrow’s (2016) definition of expertise not as a 
property of the individual, but as a social practice, ‘consisting of an asymmetrical, hierarchical 
relationship between at least two participants: the knowledgeable expert and the less 
knowledgeable advisee‘ (p.1). This definition of expertise as constructed in social interaction points 
to the need to explore the discursive strategies that laypersons themselves adopt to construct 
expertise in the CC debate.  
Eriksson and Thornborrow (2016) document how experts and advice-givers are widespread in 
current media programming, where expert opinion is sought on every aspect of life – from diet to 
child rearing, to fashion and cooking. So, expertise is ordinary in the sense that it is applied to 
everyday issues. But there is a second way in which expertise is presented as ordinary: taken 
together the papers in Eriksson and Thornborrow’s (2016) special issue highlight the fluidity of the 
concept of expertise and how this is constructed and de-constructed in the media, not only by 
‘traditional’ invited experts but also by the public within the programs. In this sense, contemporary 
media provide opportunities for ordinary people to present themselves as experts.  
Another forum in which such bids to expertise might be made is online comments on news articles. 
Readers’ comments represent a valuable resource for those seeking to understand public 
perceptions and constructions of CC (Koteyko et al., 2013). Existing studies document how online 
commentary on British newspapers denigrates CC scientists, for instance through claims that they 
have an agenda which distorts their scientific practice (Jaspal et al., 2013; Koteyko et al., 2013; 
Authors, 2018). What these studies reveal is that in recent years, readers’ comments have regularly 
challenged the expertise of CC scientists. Moreover, research shows how online comments affect 
both the behaviour and beliefs of readers (Lee & Jang, 2010; Park & Lee, 2007). What we do not yet 
know is how readers are claiming expertise themselves in  practice. The current study begins to fill 
this gap through an inductive analysis of constructions of expertise in comments made by readers of 




Comment Selection  
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The comments selected for this paper are the first 100 first-level comments to British 
newspaper articles concerning the release of the fifth report by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), in 2014, which focused on the likely impacts of CC. A search of the 
Lexis Nexis database was carried out including all UK national newspapers in the period 
February 12 to May 12, 2014, which covered the release of the second and third parts of the 
fifth IPCC report (IPCC, 2014). The search terms used were (climate change OR global 
warming) AND (IPCC OR Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), all as “major 
mentions.” Once duplicates were removed, 82 articles remained, of which 31 were available 
online and had at least 100 comments each. This was narrowed down to five articles, all of 
which were news articles on the overall content of the IPCC report; the remainder either 
focused only on specific aspects of the IPCC or the report, or were opinion pieces. These five 
articles appeared in the Telegraph (2), Guardian, Independent, and Daily Mail. We had hoped 
to select four articles, representing all format (broadsheet vs. tabloid) and ideology (left vs. 
right wing) combinations. The Guardian article (Goldenberg, 2014) was selected as the left 
wing broadsheet, being widely regarded as more left wing than the Independent. The 
Telegraph article with the most comments (Demetrio, 2014) was selected as the right wing 
broadsheet, and the Daily Mail article (Zolfagharifard, 2014) as the right wing tabloid. 
Unfortunately, there was no left wing tabloid article meeting these criteria.  
The three selected articles were very similar in terms of content, outlining the main points of the 
report and contextualising it within the scope of IPCC activities. All three included appeals from 
experts and signatories of the report for action to address foreseeable negative outcomes of CC. All 
articles included statements arguing that coordinated action could address negative consequences 
and noted the potentially devastating consequences of inaction. Although all three articles stressed 
the general consensus in the scientific community on anthropogenic CC, each quoted dissenting 
voices (in particular, that of Professor Richard Tol) and reminded readers of past and present 
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controversies. However, only the Daily Mail described governments as “lobbying” for a change in the 
wording of the report, thus implying the influence of political interests on the report.  
For each article, we extracted the first 100 first level comments (i.e. comments that were not replies 
to preceding comments) for analysis. Based on usernames, 97 different people commented on the 
Daily Mail (94 wrote one comment each, three wrote two comments each). For the Telegraph, 71 
commenters wrote one comment each, six wrote two comments each, four wrote three comments 
each, and five comments were written by guests (no username), so between 82 and 87 different 
people contributed to the dataset. For the Guardian, 90 different people commented (83 wrote one 
comment each, four wrote two comments each, three wrote three comments each).  
These first level comments can be understood as ‘inherently interactional’ in that posts online 
are “constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the 
particular or more general other(s) who are receiving or co-participating in this electronic 
communication” (Meredith and Potter, 2014, p.372). We can consider that, for these first 
level posts, the recipients are potentially overhearing, or lurking, readers; that is, the general 
readership of those newspapers. We can also understand the first-level comments as being 
responsive to the content of the newspaper articles.  
In line with the British Psychological Society’s (2017) guidelines on internet-mediated 
research, we deemed it unnecessary to obtain informed consent, given that the comments were 
freely available in the public domain (at the time, no subscription or registration was required to 
access them). In addition, the fact that commenters regularly interacted with each other on the 
platform was an indicator in our view that they were aware that these comments were public and 
open to scrutiny. In order to guarantee confidentiality, we analysed only the comment, with no 
mention of the contributors’ usernames, and any identifying information (if present) is removed 
from the illustrative comments here reported.  
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Analytical Procedure   
Discursive psychology 
Discursive psychology (DP) is a constructionist approach to studying psychological features (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992; Potter, 2010). It focuses on how descriptions, claims, allegations, identities and so 
on are made relevant in talk (Potter and Hepburn, 2008). Its interest is in discourse as the primary 
way through which human life is conducted. However, discourse is not treated as a way to access 
inner thoughts or feelings. Rather, DP analyses discourses and discursive practices as social action. It 
therefore treats discourse as being action-oriented, in that descriptions can be inspected for what 
actions they may be doing (e.g., blaming, accounting, denying). It also treats discourse as 
constructive, firstly, in the sense that any description is constructed from particular words, phrases, 
sentences and so on, which are also all treated as doing some action. Secondly, it treats discourses 
as constructing a particular version of the world (Potter and Edwards, 2001). Finally, it understands 
discourses as being situated within a specific rhetorical and interactional context.  
 DP, therefore, allows us to explore the ways in which descriptions and accounts are used in 
newspaper comments to construct notions of ‘lay’ expertise. Edwards (1998) notes that descriptions 
can be built to reflect the topic or object of that description (e.g., CC) but in doing so speakers also 
manage how they may be viewed or the subject-side of the description. We can explore how 
descriptions or accounts of CC may be written in ways that construct some knowledge on CC, and 
also present the writer as an expert. We are, therefore, showing how they construct their own 
expert knowledge through the different discursive strategies they use, which may do different 
actions depending upon the context. We make no claims about whether the commenters  are right 
or wrong, or whether they are experts or not. Instead, we are interested in the discursive strategies 
or practices used to demonstrate competence, knowledge or expertise in the topic at hand.   
  
Analytic process 
We analysed instances in which commenters made their own expertise or expert knowledge 
relevant through the language they used. After familiarising themselves with the material, the first 
two authors independently and inductively identified social and discursive actions and practices 
through which commenters claimed expertise. Once the authors had identified a list of practices, 
these were discussed in relation to the overall aims of the research (Wiggins, 2016). Previous DP 
literature was examined to explore our list of discursive devices identified in the newspaper data, 
compared to descriptions and accounts in other relevant literature (e.g., Potter, 1996). Wiggins 
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(2016) notes that “there are no hard-and-fast rules for which analytical issue to focus on” (p.130), so 
we were guided by the aims of the research and by previous literature within the field of DP. We use 
this literature in the analysis to highlight the similarities and differences between the practices used 
in this context and in others. 
Once we had agreed on a list of devices, both authors then returned to the dataset to ensure that all 
instances of these practices had been collected (Wiggins, 2016). Once the collection had been built, 
the authors went through each instance and described the practices which were used to construct 
notions of expertise, and what social actions these descriptions were doing. Extracts used in the 
analysis presented below were chosen to demonstrate the most typical uses of these practices, 
although it has, of course, not been possible to include examples of every variation of every practice.  
 
Analysis 
We identified a number of discursive strategies which individuals used in order to present 
themselves as experts. We consider these strategies ‘discursive’ in the sense that they are action-
oriented and recipient designed. The practices employed for constructing the author as an expert 
are often used in conjunction with one another, with more than one strategy often present in a 
single comment. As indicated in Figure 1, these discursive practices fell into two main categories: 
presenting oneself as an expert, and constructing an argument as factual. There were several distinct 
strategies within each of these categories, as explained below. 
 
 
Figure 1 Discursive strategies aimed at conveying expertise  
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Presenting oneself as expert 
 
In this first section, we explore the discursive strategies adopted to present oneself as an expert. We 
identified two strategies here: the use of category entitlements or category-bound activities, and 
using expert/technical language. In each section we will show how these strategies are used to 
perform different actions related to presenting themselves as an expert.  
 
Category Entitlements and category-bound activities  
One key point emerging from the analysis is that individuals very rarely explicitly claim expertise, by 
stating, for example, “I am a climate scientist”. Using such category-based claims to expertise 
provides the author with an ‘entitlement’ to particular knowledge related to that category (Potter, 
1996). However, the use of this category does not reflect some fixed identity for any individual, but 
is rather an interactional resource for claiming entitlement to have knowledge or expertise on a 
particular topic ( Potter, 1996; Rapley et al., 2003). In the rare instances in which posters did claim 
expertise through category entitlement, it referred to an area of expertise which was not directly 
related to climate science:   
 
1 When I was an undergrad Astrophycist astronomers were just starting to be able to pick up  
2 near earth asteroids in enough time to calculate the chance of them hitting the earth long  
3 enough in advance to do something about it. 
[…] 
4 What nobody expected was that if we put out a warning saying there was a 90% chance of a  
5 catastrophic meteorite hit nobody would do anything. But that is exactly what has happened  
6 with these IPCC reports. Amazing. (The Guardian, Post 37)  
 
In the above extract, the participant is using their qualification of ‘astrophysicist undergraduate’ to 
present themselves as entitled to make a claim about CC by virtue of having this qualification. The 
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entitlement draws on an implicit category-bound predicate or characteristic (Stokoe, 2012) of 
someone with a degree in astrophysics; that is, that they understand science. It is this ‘expertise’ 
around science that gives the author the entitlement to comment on the response to the IPCC 
reports.  
 
Commenters also sometimes implicitly claimed membership of the category of expert through 
carrying out category-bound activities which are associated with that category (Sacks, 1992). The 
viewer’s maxim proposed by Sacks (1992) states “if a member sees a category-bound activity being 
done, then, if one sees it being done by a member of a category to which the activity is bound, see it 
that way” (p.259). Thus, if a commenter shows that they have carried out activities that are associated 
with the category of ‘expert’ then they can be seen as being part of that category.  
 
1 I have performed some simple annual algebraic calculations that prove global warming using 
2 a thermal model as opposed to the greenhouse theory. This simple approach becomes  
3 significant when combined with classic atmospheric weather patterns because it shows why  
4 the arctic is melting and antarctic not which has been the thorn in the side for the  
5 greenhouse theory. Why is this theory critical to the planet? Simply reducing CO2  
6 concentration in the atmosphere in the short time frame is nearly impossible, thus the  
7 greenhouse theory identifies a problem that cannot be resolved in the time frame necessary.  
8 Simply stated, the thermal theory hypothesis: the planet is warming primarily due to the  
9 combustion effect of fossil fuels as opposed to the greenhouse effect […] 
 (The Guardian, Post 54) 
Here the commenter presents the category-bound activity of carrying out “algebraic calculations”, 
which can be read as an activity that belongs to a particular category: an expert.  Chovanec (2016) 
states, when talking about documentaries, that expertise is to ‘name and explain diverse 
phenomena’. While the commenter does not, then, explicitly state that they are an ‘expert’ in the 
area, they position themselves as someone who carries out ‘expert-based’ activities. In the rest of 
the post, the commenter positions themselves as someone who has the expertise to be able to 
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explain the subject to other readers, and positions the potential recipients and respondents of the 
post as needing this explaining to them ‘simply’.   
 
The use of expert/technical language 
The use of technical or scientific language may also mark a commenter as an expert even if they do 
not explicitly claim to be one. In the example below, the commenter is explaining their scepticism of 
human-made CC.  
 
1 […] In thermodynamic terms it is a 'perpetual motion machine of the second kind', the lower  
2 atmosphere using its own internal energy to cause itself to heat and expand, imaginary  
3 'positive feedback'. To create this fantasy, the models use 3x exaggerated GHE, a bad  
4 mistake by Hansen's group in 1981, not picked up in peer review. The final part of the fraud is  
5 c. 25% extra cloud albedo in 'hind casting' to offset imaginary temperature rise. 
6 In reality, there is no significant CO2-AGW. There was AGW from a different cause, but it  
7 saturated about 2000. The World is starting to cool as we enter the new Little Ice Age. Pray  
8 for cheap gas reserves to keep us warm for the next 50 years [...] 
(The Telegraph, Post 60) 
 
Throughout this extract, the commenter draws on technical language and subject-specific 
knowledge, such as ‘3x exaggerated GHE’ (line 3) and the reference to ‘Hansen’s group’, with a 
specific date used to provide further evidence of their subject-based knowledge (line 4). The use of 
such technical language can function to persuade potential recipients of the commenter’s 
knowledge, and as such the author is implicitly claiming expertise.  We can see how this subject-
specific language is often accompanied by value-laden qualifiers ‘imaginary’, ‘fantasy’, ‘fraud’ 
(which, in turn, suggest ulterior motives). At line 6, there is a truth statement (‘In reality, there is no 
significant CO2-AGW), and a series of further statements that are all constructed as factual. There 
are no hedges or mitigation. Having established authority by adopting technical language and 
suggested the existence of specific stake or bias (Edwards and Potter, 1992) driving other experts’ 
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assessments of CC, the commenter presents their interpretation as factual and truthful thus 
demonstrating their own expertise.  
 
We see, then, that authors very rarely make explicit claims to expertise. However, they do 
make implicit claims by presenting themselves as doing activities that place them in the category 
‘expert’. As we saw with the final extract, there are ways in which authors can display expertise 
without explicitly claiming it. One way of doing this is through constructing their argument as factual, 
which we explore next.  
 
Constructing an argument as factual 
 
A key focus of discursive psychology is in examining how descriptions, statements or claims are 
constructed as factual (Potter, 1996). In a field like CC where the topic is disputed and discussed by 
commenters, presenting a claim as factual becomes important for the possibility of persuading 
recipients of the validity of the claim. We would also argue that in presenting a statement as factual, 
commenters are also implicitly claiming some expertise in that area. We have identified several 
strategies which are used by commenters to present claims as factual: a) using links and sources; b) 
truth statements; c) appeals to common sense, and d) presenting solutions.  
  
 
Using links and sources 
 
While individuals can present knowledge as their own and therefore present themselves as experts, 
another strategy identified was for commenters to use links to other sources providing information 
which is presented as credible. As such, the authors do not necessarily construct themselves as 
experts, but rather align their opinion to that of recognised experts. This group of strategies parallels 
the use of notes in Patrona’s (2016) work: while in the context of TV debates people rely on notes to 
support and better organise their claims, when commenting on news online they have access to the 
internet and can provide quotes and links that can complement and expand their argument. In doing 
so, commenters construct consensus while also implicitly stating their own expertise (i.e. their 
knowledge of the topic and their familiarity with other authoritative backers of their position).  
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 This practice of claiming expertise can allow for recipients to see that there is some 
consensus around the arguments being made, from those who have a higher category entitlement 
to make such arguments. This type of strategy for demonstrating consensus is particularly important 
when considering the scale of debates around whether there is a scientific consensus about 
anthropogenic CC (Boykoff & Roberts, 2007). In the following extract, the commenter draws on a 
quote by an organisation to present their argument as credible.  
 
1 GeolSoc - many members work in fossil fuels, so no agenda here. 
2 "This rate of increase of CO2 is unprecedented, 
3 even in comparison with the massive injection of carbon into the atmosphere 55 million years  
4 ago that led to the major PETM warming event, 
5 and is likely to lead to a similar rise in both temperature and sea level. 
(The Guardian, post 4) 
 
In this post, arguing in favour of the science and call to action in the IPCC report, the commenter 
uses GeolSoc (Geological Society) as a source of information, thus using a group which has a 
category-based entitlement to knowledge or expertise about CC. Moreover, the comment features 
reported speech, which offers the reader direct access to the claims, rather than a paraphrased 
claim, so that they can make their own judgement about its accuracy (Stokoe and Edwards, 2007). In 
this way, expertise is not claimed based on the commenter’s expertise but on their recourse to 
another group’s expertise. This also functions to demonstrate a level of consensus around CC. It is 
also noteworthy in this case that they present a stake inoculation at line 1 (cf. Edwards and Potter, 
2005) ‘many members work in fossil fuels, so no agenda here’ in order to refute the potential that 
this group could be deemed as biased in some way.  
A similar strategy which can also function as a way of either supporting or undermining the 
claims about scientific consensus on CC, is to back up arguments with links to ‘official’ authoritative 
sources:  
   
1 Carbon dioxide, considered the main vector for human-caused global warming, is some  
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2 0.038% of the atmosphere[1]- a trace gas. 
[….]  
3 [1] Fundamentals of Physical Geography, 2nd Edition 
4 by Michael Pidwirny Concentration varies slightly with the growing season in the northern  
5 hemisphere. HYPERLINK  
 6 "http://www.physicalgeography.n..."http://www.physicalgeography.n... 
 
(The Telegraph, post 15)  
 
The author of this (originally extremely long) comment, which argues against anthropogenic CC, 
displays familiarity with the academic style of communication: they use references and endnotes to 
provide sources backing up their statements. This is an identity statement in itself, as this familiarity 
is likely to come from training (and therefore ‘expertise’).  The use of other sources to back up their 
statement is also a way to build the idea that there is scientific support or consensus about their 





In previous extracts, we have seen that alongside claims to expertise in the form of technical 
language and the use of other sources, some comments also employed matter-of-fact statements to 
convey expertise. While these types of statements can be used in combination with other strategies, 
in this section we will focus on these types of ‘truth statements. Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) identified 
what they called an empiricist repertoire, which gives the impression that the comments ‘follow 
unproblematically and inescapably from the empirical characteristics of an impersonal natural 
world’(p.56) . We see this empiricist repertoire in the following extract.  
 
1 the inconvenient truth is the medieval warm period was warmer than today - and the roman  
2 warm period even warmer than that. many of the temps we are being compared to were as  
3 we were coming off an established "cold" period following a mini-ice age. 
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(Daily Mail, post 67) 
 
The commenter draws on the title of the Al Gore documentary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ (line 1) which 
is considered one of the main ways in which CC was initially bought into the public eye. In using the 
title of the documentary, the author places their comments and assertions on a par with those in the 
documentary: the commenter is now presenting their own ‘inconvenient truth’. Potter (1996) notes 
that if too much detail is provided in an explanation, it can be inspected for contradictions or 
confusions. In order to avoid this, individuals can be systematically ‘vague’, presenting few details 
which could be contested. We see this in the above comment, where the author provides fairly 
vague time periods (line 1-2) ‘medieval’ and ‘roman’ warm periods rather than specific dates. They 
do not provide definite temperatures, but rather simply say that the temperature was ‘warmer’ (line 
2). In this way, they present their argument as being the real ‘inconvenient truth’ but equally do not 
offer any specific details which potential recipients could challenge.  
Appeals to common sense 
 
In this section, we explore how common knowledge is evoked as a source of expertise by the 
commenters. In her analysis of the way Greek citizens presented their expertise in the context of a 
political discussion programme, Patrona (2016) identifies ‘Appealing to common sense’ as a 
discursive strategy. This is a way to affirm one’s expertise by downplaying that of others. In 
Moscovici’s terms, this might be seen as a form of anchoring an unknown phenomenon (CC and its 
science) to something that is well known (Moscovici, 1981). Indeed, Farr (1993) identifies in social 
representations an important theoretical tool in understanding how the public makes sense of 
science.  
 
1 ANYONE who does anytime travelling will have noticed that seasons all over are getting  
2 messed up. It's not just the UK but EVERYWHERE.That's what climate change is doing. 
(The Telegraph, post 53) 
Here, the participant is restricting the category of people who have this commonly held knowledge 
to ‘anyone who does anytime travelling’ (line 1). In this sense, it claims expertise based on the 
practice of travelling, and it is not exclusive to a select group of qualified individuals (as indicated by 
the employment of block capitals in ANYONE). This experience-based expertise will lead to the 
common-sense conclusion that ‘seasons all over are getting messed up’. In other words, there is 
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consensus among people who travel – the ‘experts’ – that climate is changing. The use of the term 
‘EVERYWHERE’ (line 2) implies that this is generally known and easily detectable. This claim of 
practice-based expertise functions to set up an oppositional category.  Individuals who do not 
recognise what is happening are either lacking common sense or do not have expertise (they do not 
travel). In other words, CC should be recognised  if you have the requisite expertise or common 
sense.   
In the following comment, the commenter also claims expertise through common-sense knowledge.  
 
1 Warmism \ climatism is so yesterday . We all know it's a complete load of rubbish , there is  
2 no more mileage in it , give it a break permanently . No one in their right mind believes in  
3 that nonsense . It's not science . It's fairy tale and a giant scam . 
(The Telegraph, post 68) 
The commenter draws on the idea that it is well known that CC is ‘a complete load of rubbish’ (line 
1), through stating that ‘we all know’ (line 2), which indicates that there is a consensus around this 
argument (Potter, 1996). They also set up two opposing categories: those who do not believe in CC, 
and those who do – who are not in their right minds. It is also implied that those who believe in CC 
are not scientists but have instead been duped by a ‘giant scam’. In this way, they set up the idea 
that CC deniers or sceptics are scientists and experts, while those who believe in CC are gullible and 
not in their right mind.  
Presenting solutions 
 
In this final section, we show how commenters present solutions to climate change as a way of 
claiming expertise.  
1 When will we stop funding these charlatans. They now have as much credibility as FIFA. 
2 Dredge the rivers, stop building on flood plains. rebuild the sea walls & get on with life 
(The Telegraph, comment 44) 
 
This comment uses ‘truth statements’, but in this case, they are presented as ‘solutions’ to the issue 
of climate change. The author offers three examples for how to manage CC, all of which are 
presented as obvious. However, they are also fairly vague – there is little explanation of what parts 
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of CC this would solve, or any specifics about which rivers would be dredged for example. As such, 
although implicit expertise is claimed through presenting solutions (which by implication the IPCC 
have not thought of), there is a systematic vagueness (Potter, 1996) which means that they are less 




At a time when scientific credentials are no longer unanimously accepted as vouches for expertise, it 
becomes important to understand how expertise is constructed by the public. In the case of CC, the 
issue becomes particularly complicated: the phenomenon itself is very complex and a deep 
understanding requires the combination of competences derived from a series of highly specialised 
disciplines. Moreover, research shows how sections of the British media may have further muddied 
the waters, using a variety of strategies to undermine the scientific consensus and the expertise of 
climate scientists (e.g. Boykoff and Mansfield, 2008; Nerlich, 2010; Authors, 2012). We argue that by 
implication, readers might be left with the impression that expertise in this area is ‘up-for-grabs’. 
The current paper showed that expertise was very rarely explicitly claimed; more subtle strategies 
were employed that can seem very convincing but are hard to challenge or question.  
One type of strategy was to construct oneself as having a category entitlement to expertise on CC. 
Commenters rarely employed straightforward category entitlements – rather, they tended to signal 
their belonging to an ‘entitled’ category implicitly, for example by carrying out category-bound 
activities.  These implicit constructions of expertise are perhaps harder to challenge than explicit 
constructions. Moreover, if people rely upon such implicit indicators of expertise, they may pay less 
attention to other credentials, such as scientific training and peer review, in public debates and news 
reports.  
Another common strategy was to present arguments as factual. This was achieved in several ways. 
Commenters claimed expertise by adopting technical language, backing up their statements with 
relevant links or quoting what they deemed to be authoritative sources. Interestingly, these included 
politicians as well as scientists. The factuality of the comment was also claimed by making what we 
called ‘truth statements’, that is, by presenting opinion as ‘matter-of-fact’, without even attempting 
to argue in favour of it or justify the position taken. In some ways, these strategies mirror media 
presentations of CC. For instance, the media sometimes present politicians as CC experts (see 
Boykoff and Roberts, 2007; for similar discursive strategies in another political area, see Authors, 
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2017), and present experts’ contributions in the form of soundbites, where the expert gives a 
statement, rather than an argument (Kruvand, 2012).  
Finally, commenters often presented their expertise by appealing to people’s awareness of generally 
known facts.  Either by appealing to people’s direct experiences, or by offering ‘simple’ solutions to 
the complex issue of CC, commenters seemed to construct themselves as more knowledgeable and 
competent than others who do not have the same experience or who make competing claims. 
Unlike many of the other strategies, truth claims and appeals to common sense do not emulate 
scientific discourse. Indeed, in some cases, these strategies may work to challenge scientific 
expertise on the grounds that it contradicts one’s own lived experience and knowledge. There are 
parallels here with the use of the idiom ‘listen to your body’ in online forums to challenge scientific 
knowledge about health (Versteeg et al., 2018). It may be, then, that there are tensions and 
synergies between specific strategies in the construction of expertise. For instance, perhaps 
strategies that assume an underlying confidence in sound science (such as category entitlements and 
technical language) tend to be deployed together by commenters to work up a more convincing 
account. Future work could usefully explore this possibility.  
While a comparison between competing perspectives on CC was not the focus of this article and 
frequency of different strategies was not counted, it is noteworthy that all the strategies reported 
were represented across the spectrum (i.e. by people arguing both for and against the existence of 
anthropogenic CC). The presence of the same strategies in both ‘camps’ offers an interesting insight 
into the potential difficulty faced by a reader in determining others’ expertise. If both supporters 
and deniers of CC use the same discursive strategies to claim expertise, readers are perhaps forced 
to rely upon their existing political and moral allegiances in order to evaluate them.  
Many of the strategies identified are common ways in which people construct reality in 
conversational terms (Potter, 1996), and in which ‘ordinary expertise’ (Eriksson and Thornborrow, 
2016) is presented in mainstream media. Our commenters seemed to converge on an idea of 
expertise similar to ‘entitlement to speak the truth and be listened to’, reflecting the social, 
relational definition of expertise offered by Eriksson and Thornborrow (2016). While we agree that it 
is important to recognise and assign expertise to people on the basis of their own experiences and 
on the ways in which they use and make sense of mediated messages (e.g. Couldry et al., 2016), at 
the same time we argue that there needs to be a shift in the way we think about - and indeed talk 
about - expertise. This is not to replicate an ‘elitist’ view of democracy, rather, to avoid the risks 
associated with claims to expertise in areas in which one has none. In other words, we should 
redefine what we mean by knowledge, and who are the important actors whose voices we need to 
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hear from. All citizens are impacted by whether governments decide to uptake the IPCC 
recommendations, so they have every right to be heard, both on and offline. Thus, when it comes to 
news media, it is important that everyone is given a voice so as to provide a wide representation of 
perspectives in a political debate (cf. Curran et al. 2014). Yet, it is important that citizens are 
empowered to represent their own expertise as intrinsically valid and not to claim expertise 
elsewhere. 
 People are indeed experts in their own life, and some may be scientifically trained and able to argue 
adopting scientific terminologies, or to evaluate the soundness of scientific arguments. It is 
important to note that we are not making claims about the actual expertise of commenters on one 
or the other ‘side’ of the debate: Kahan et al. (2012) show how having expertise in science literacy 
and numeracy does not mean holding one or the other position in the CC debate. At the same time 
however, the easy access to information online makes it easier for people to construct an ‘expert-
sounding’ argument (cf. Nichols, 2017) but this does not mean that anyone can claim expertise in CC 
science. It is important therefore to disentangle political identity and ideology from science-based 
knowledge and evidence (see e.g. Kahan, 2014).  
There were some limitations to the current study. The lack of a suitable left wing tabloid article 
means that a particular section of the media-commenting public was not represented in our 
research. Media articles can be accessed across the globe, so caution is required in interpreting the 
strategies identified as typical of the British public in particular. Our focus was on identifying and 
unpacking key strategies used to construct expertise, and it was beyond the scope of the study to 
compare their frequency among supporters versus deniers, and across media outlets. Our typology 
of key strategies would provide a useful starting point for future research to conduct more content-
analysis based research examining whether and how they are associated with particular ideological 
positions with respect to CC. Finally, the current study focuses on the strategies readers used to 
construct their own expertise. It was beyond the article’s scope to also examine how commenters 
challenged the expertise of others. Studies have already shown that in online comments on British 
newspaper articles (particularly those published by right wing newspapers such as the Daily Mail and 
The Telegraph), readers challenge scientific expertise on CC (Jaspal et al., 2013; Koteyko et al., 2013; 
Authors, 2018). Future research might usefully explore whether and how discursive devices 
promoting one’s own expertise are used in conjunction with strategies to undermine that of others. 
In conclusion, readers commenting on CC news claimed expertise by presenting themselves as 
comfortable with the subject and style of communication attributed to experts in the media, or by 
challenging this type of knowledge and proposing instead a more ‘common sensical’ understanding 
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of reality, thus appealing to a different form of expertise, borne out of direct experience and 
understanding. This diversity indicates that the very idea of expertise is a fluid concept that is not 
captured satisfactorily by ‘traditional’ definitions such as the one provided by Hoffman (1998).  
Furthermore, claims to expertise were often indirect. This combination of fluidity and indirectness 
could make it difficult to challenge such claims. As such, the lay strategies identified in this paper 
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